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Realizing the Promise: Individual
Development Accounts
by Larry W. Beeferman
sset-based policies can address pover-
ty and inequality effectively and
command broad support. Asset-based
policies, which center on building human
capital and financial wealth, address the
common needs and aspirations of Americans
by rewarding work, promoting initiative and
self-reliance, and embodying widely shared
beliefs about fairness and opportunity.
Asset-based policies invest in building
capacity among Americans to achieve eco-
nomic security and opportunity. They focus
not just on meeting short-term needs but on
building assets for the long term. Making
fewer judgments about who is “truly needy,”
asset-based policies promote self-reliance,
initiative, and growth. At their core, asset-
based policies enable individuals to acquire
and renew the skills required to get a good-
paying job, buy a home, start a business or
new career, weather the storms of personal
Acar repair) or a computer. When a
disaster, emergency, or tragedy
threatens to disrupt people’s lives,
financial assets enable them to bet-
ter survive the crisis.
Financial asset-building policies
have been directed primarily to the
more affluent. For example, pre-tax
retirement accounts help families
build for the future, and home mort-
gage tax deductions are a direct
governmental subsidy to homeown-
ers. Tax-favored, private employer-
based subsidies of medical and other
benefits are not immediately direct-
ed at wealth accumulation, but they
enhance the income flow available
for saving. 
Many low-income Americans, mean-
while, either are unable to take
advantage of such policies or bene-
fit far less from them than the afflu-
ent do. Low-income Americans are
often discouraged from accumulat-
ing financial assets because they are
disqualified from participation in
income benefit programs such as
Supplemental Security Income and
Food Stamps if their assets exceed a
very low level. Government policies,
such as those reflected in the
Community Reinvestment Act, have
not been sufficient to assure that
low-income households have access
to mainstream financial institutions
that provide services that may be
crucial to saving and accumulating
financial assets, purchasing a home,
or starting a business. Moreover,
many of these households lack the
financial knowledge and skills to




(IDAs), are one prototype for poli-
cies that enable low-income fami-
lies to build financial assets. A
concept pioneered by Michael
Sherraden in his seminal book,
Assets and the Poor, IDAs operate
from the premise that low-income
families can save and accumulate
financial assets if the proper sup-
ports are in place. IDAs are dedi-
cated savings accounts containing
or family crises, and live comfort-
ably in retirement.
The Elements 
of an Asset-Based 
Policy Framework
A framework for asset building has
many elements typically thought of
as individual assets, although other
assets, such as community resources,
may come into play. Individual assets,
however, are important because they
directly affect the economic well-
being of households.
Income assets are rooted in jobs
that are the source of cash income
and benefits. For most households,
employment-based income enables
them to attain economic well-being.
Government policies, such as unem-
ployment insurance and minimum
wage laws, protect and enhance
employment income. Other policies,
including Temporary Assistance to
Needy Families (TANF) and Food
Stamps, provide income in cash or
kind to bolster or replace employ-
ment income. Another asset is
human capital, which includes the
knowledge and skills that enable
individuals to obtain good jobs and
move up the economic ladder. 
In this article, we focus primarily on
financial assets, such as savings and
checking accounts, stocks and
bonds, and equity in property.
Clearly, financial assets afford peo-
ple opportunities and empower
them. Financial assets can yield a
substantial amount of income to
sustain everyday life. But even for
the vast majority of people who
must support themselves from
employment, building financial
assets is important and sometimes
even critical. Financial assets substi-
tute for or supplement employment
income — when people lose a job,
can only work part-time, or suffer a
reduction in pay — or augment
Social Security income during
retirement. Financial assets enable
individuals to make a down pay-
ment on a home, pay for education
or training, or start a new business.
They make possible a significant
purchase such as a car (or a major
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deposits by low-income account
holders matched by private and/or
public sources.
Sherraden’s book sparked interest
and inquiries among public officials
that led, in 1996, to bipartisan sup-
port for the Clinton Administration
proposal to include IDAs in its wel-
fare reform legislation. The law
included an option to allow states
to use federal funds for cash assis-
tance to match savings in IDAs.
Two years later, and again with
bipartisan support, Congress passed
the Assets for Independence Act.
The Act authorized $125 million
over five years to be awarded
through competitive grants to non-
profits for IDA demonstration proj-
ects. During the past three years,
$45 million has been appropriated
for that purpose.  In 1999 and 2000,
the Office of Refugee Resettlement
within the Department of Health
and Human Services provided a
total of $8 million to permit states
and nonprofits to offer IDAs for
low-income refugees. 
The Basic IDA Model
Many IDAs — both publicly and pri-
vately supported — share common
features, such as similar enrollment
criteria. Typically, individuals may
participate if they meet certain
income requirements.1 Once enrolled,
participants generally remain eligible
for matches only if they make
deposits into their savings accounts
in specified minimum amounts and
at a specified frequency. By design,
all IDAs involve matched savings. To
date, match rates for IDA programs
have generally ranged from one to
one, to three to one, although in
some cases additional matches from
other sources are permissible.2
Match money is generally kept in a
separate, parallel account. It is dis-
bursed for allowed purposes only
when the participant successfully
completes program requirements,
including those relating to saving.
IDA programs vary in the uses per-
mitted for matched savings. The
primary uses allowed are home-
ownership, small business develop-
ment, and post-secondary educa-
tion or job training. However, some
states permit use for car purchase
or repair, home repairs or improve-
ments, one-time family medical
emergencies and (limited) health
care costs not covered by insur-
ance, emergency expenses, retire-
ment, work-related activity (such as
child care), and supportive counsel-
ow-income families can save and
accumulate financial assets if the
proper supports are in place. L5c  &  b
are linked to increased earnings. A
number of personal and work-relat-
ed supports are also aimed at
spurring “self-sufficiency.” There are
no limits on the use of the escrow
monies, although participants may
use them for homeownership or
other housing-related purposes. 
A Seattle Housing Authority pro-
gram is more complex and ambi-
tious. The amounts deposited into
participants’ accounts are linked to
their rent levels rather than earnings
or savings. Rents are frozen for two-
year intervals (and hence, not linked
to resident earnings), but ultimately
they are stepped up to market rate.
While the Massachusetts and the
HUD programs are individually ori-
ented, the Seattle program is, in
part, community oriented. The idea
is that if large numbers of residents
within a single public housing com-
munity can be engaged in the pro-
gram, the individual impacts will be
mutually reinforcing in ways that




In light of the foregoing descrip-
tions, what is the best way forward
for asset-development policy? First,
income, human capital, and finan-
cial asset strategies, along with other
complementary asset strategies, are
keys to economic well-being for all
families. Second, awareness of and
support for asset-development poli-
cies are only now emerging, so there
is time to fashion them. This requires
openness to a range of ideas and a
willingness to experiment. 
Our federal political structure
affords opportunities for such exper-
imentation at the state level. For that
reason, state asset-building strate-
gies should be vigorously pressed.
Monetary support for IDA programs
at the state level, however, has been
modest. The same has been true at
the federal level. But because expe-
rience with IDAs has been encourag-
ing, it warrants additional federal
support. Concerns about fairness,
uniformity, efficiency, and funding
necessarily point to federal legisla-
tion at some point.
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turn, such endeavors may provide
grounding for Lifelong Learning
Accounts (LiLAs) funded by
employees, employers, and govern-
ment, for which a foundation-fund-
ed pilot project is in the works. The
project would include universal eli-
gibility for accounts that are
portable from one employer to
another and would be funded
through voluntary, tax-favored
contributions by employees.
Other programs in Massachusetts
and Oregon link gaining a financial
stake to obtaining and maintaining
employment for a specific period of
time, rather than saving. The
amount of the stake is tied to the
length of the period during which
participants work. The ability of the
participants to secure and maintain
their jobs is enhanced by a public
subsidy of their wages, paid by the
government to their employers.
Still other programs are based on
housing. These are available to res-
idents of public housing and recipi-
ents of cash assistance (Section 8
vouchers) for private-sector hous-
ing. Housing-based programs
involve the creation of accounts in
which residents accumulate finan-
cial assets. But unlike IDAs, the
sums in these accounts accrue not
by virtue of saving, as such, but
from diversion of some rent money
participants might otherwise pay to
the public housing agency. The
incentive in this policy is that the
amount of money being deposited
increases as an individual’s income
rises. A Massachusetts program, for
example, is available only to resi-
dents whose housing is solely state-
subsidized. The amount of rent
diverted is linked to increased earned
income and is matched by the state,
one to two. Account monies pay for
transition to private housing. 
The U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development’s (HUD) man-
dated Family Self-Sufficiency
Program has similar accounts but it
is geared to reducing recipients’
reliance on “welfare assistance,”
with the possible corollary of no
longer requiring housing assistance.
The sums deposited in the accounts
ing. Some IDA programs also pro-
vide or require participation in
financial counseling, economic lit-
eracy or education classes, and peer
support groups. They may also be
linked to tax preparation services,
for example, those that enable par-
ticipants to receive Earned Income
Tax Credit funds.
IDAs and Other Asset-
Building Models
Even at this early stage, a wide
range of IDA models can be crafted.
IDAs can be targeted to serve a par-
ticular segment of the low-income
population or work within a partic-
ular institutional framework. For
example, an IDA program in
California is geared to current or
recent TANF recipients who want to
build their education and skills. By
contrast, another, also in California,
is directed to low-wage manufactur-
ing employees and is workplace-
based rather than community-based,
as are many IDAs currently. A pri-
vately supported IDA program
planned for Minnesota is also
employment-based, but would target
low-income workers more broadly
and entails much greater employer
support than the California one.
Finally, a different program in
Pennsylvania, although not work-
place-based, is focused on a particu-
lar economic sector; it serves child-
care workers with the larger mission
of supporting a childcare workers’
cooperative. Clearly, the IDA model
is adaptable to a variety of settings
and goals, requiring different com-
binations of organizational compe-
tencies and resources.
Other policies have similar goals. For
example, an Individual Learning
Account (ILA) effort in Pennsylvania
involved an IDA-like program. It was
focused specifically on using savings
for increasing participants’ human
capital through gaining education
and training that had the potential
for upward job mobility, particularly
at the place of employment. Both
participating employers and the state
provided matching funds. 
These efforts may yield useful ideas
for funding and operating
Individual Training Accounts (ITAs)
or vouchers under the federal
Workforce Investment Act. States
have latitude in how they design
their training account/voucher sys-
tems. At least one pilot project,
funded by the U.S. Department of
Labor, is being carried out to link to
the learning account concept. In
wareness of and support for
asset-development policies are
only now emerging. A6c  &  b 6c  &  b
The Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council has ruled that banks’ support of IDAs
can receive Community Reinvestment Act
credit. Financial institutions that receive a
Bank Enterprise Award from the Community
Development Financial Institutions Fund can
be given up to $50 per IDA to offset adminis-
trative costs. The federal Housing and Urban
Development Department recently confirmed
that Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG) monies can be used for IDAs. A leg-
islative initiative currently under considera-
tion by the Congress, the Savings for Working
Families Act, would vastly expand federal sup-
port for IDAs through a tax credit rather than
a grant mechanism.
Activity at the state level in support of IDAs has
been considerable. As of September 2001, 23
states had passed IDA legislation and had a
state-supported program in operation. Nine use
state general funds, eight provide state tax cred-
its for IDA program contributors, six employ
CDBG funds, and twelve use TANF funds to
match IDA savings. (Three state-administered
programs do not allow for a match.) 
In New England, four states have enacted legis-
lation in support of IDAs. Connecticut appropri-
ated $400,000 in state monies for match and
administration of IDAs. Rhode Island authorized
a pilot program for IDAs in connection with wel-
fare reform, but TANF or other monies have not
yet been allocated for the program. Maine
approved a 50 percent tax credit, for a total of
up to $200,000 per year, to donations to Family
Development Accounts. Vermont appropriated
$250,000 in state funds to be used for IDAs as
part of its welfare reform program and an equal
amount in the form of a challenge grant to be
matched with private funds, to link IDA partici-
pants to the state’s college savings plan.
Vermont also has an IDA program funded by
CDBG monies. Although no legislation for IDAs
has been enacted in Massachusetts, the state has
a growing network of privately supported IDAs.
Substantial private, nonprofit sector IDA initia-
tives have also been undertaken. To date, the
largest IDA demonstration project has been the
American Dream Demonstration (ADD). Supported
by major private foundations, it started in June
1997, had 2,378 participants in thirteen locations
around the country as of June 30, 2000, and was
scheduled to end in December of 2001. ADD pro-
grams were run by private, nonprofit organiza-
tions, including six community development
organizations and two each of social service agen-
cies, bank or credit unions, housing development
organizations, and collaboratives.
Public and Private
Methods to Finance IDAs
As of this writing, support for increasing federal
monies for IDAs appears to be bipartisan. There is,
however, resistance to a large-scale increase and to
the potentially more open-ended tax credit funding
mechanism proposed under the Savings for Working
Families Act, as compared to one based on federal
appropriations. Success at moving IDAs to a larger
scale has its challenges and perhaps its limits. One
challenge is assuring that enough organizations are
available with the capacity and the access to resources
to manage IDAs at an increased scale. Another chal-
lenge is designing and assuring support for multi-
level and related, but possibly distinct, IDA programs.
Use of tax credits targeted primarily at financial insti-
tutions may have scale limits and possible disadvan-
tages in the way it might channel the IDA develop-
ment. A refundable tax credit — along the lines of the
Earned Income Tax Credit — would be better, but
establishing it would be more difficult.
Of course, other initiatives offer promise — more like-
ly at the federal, but possibly at the state level. For
example, a number of Congressmen, scholars, and
others have made proposals for universal children’s
opportunity or savings accounts. These accounts
would be seeded by public money at birth and, per-
haps, at significant times during youth, with opportu-
nities for building assets through young account-
holders’ savings and contributions by family members
and others. Such a scheme would create a financial
asset-building infrastructure for all, one that could in
the longer run afford real financial results to all.
Finally, as suggested in the introductory comments, a
variety of assets — most often, individual ones, but
frequently collective ones as well — enable individu-
als to enjoy economic security and opportunity. As
IDAs and other strategies seem to suggest, these dif-
ferent kinds of asset building are intertwined and may
often be interdependent. The key point is that asset
development can provide an essential framework for
thinking about the kinds of policies that will enable
low-income families and individuals to attain eco-
nomic well-being.
Endnotes
1. Individuals may participate if they (a) are eligible for
Transitional Assistance to Needy Families, (b) have
annual incomes at or below a specified percentage of
the federal poverty level or at or below a specified frac-
tion of area household median income, or (c) are eligi-
ble for the federal Earned Income Tax Credit.
2. Matches may be limited in amount on a monthly,
annual, or multi-year basis and may be as high as
$2,000 per year and up to $10,000 over a period of
years. Programs appear to universally exempt the
matching monies from state taxation.
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The American Dream
Demonstration
by Larry W. Beeferman
T
he American Dream Demonstration offers
the most comprehensive evaluation of IDA
programs to date. The outcomes, including
monthly net deposits, savings rates, and levels of
continued participation, are encouraging. It should8c  &  b
significant link with income and it
was not strongly linked with educa-
tion, employment, or receipt of
public assistance. It had no associ-
ation with home ownership, pass-
book-account ownership, or insur-
ance coverage.
Savings strategies: Participants
used a variety of strategies to save.
Most significant was their more effi-
cient use of resources — shopping
more carefully and eating out less,
followed by buying used as opposed
to new clothing — and reducing con-
sumption by spending less on
leisure, followed by cigarettes and
alcohol, and then, postponing visits
to the doctor or dentist. More mod-
est numbers worked more hours or
sold household or personal items. To
some degree they employed psycho-
logical strategies, such as direct
deposit, goal-setting, mental account-
ing, earmarking of tax refunds, and
treating the deposit as a monthly
bill. Many acknowledged that as a
result of participation, they had less
money for leisure than they would
like and were less likely to save in
other ways, outside of their IDAs.
Modest numbers had to give up food
or other necessities or had more dif-
ficulty paying bills. These survey
results are encouraging and are con-
sonant with evaluations of ADD
data suggesting that IDA deposits
come from both new savings and
shifted assets; as of yet, researchers
do not know the importance of each
in the mix.
Non-savings and long-term impacts:
The overwhelming majority of cur-
rent recipients surveyed expressed
confidence about their futures
because they had IDAs and said that
they felt more economically secure
and more in control of their lives as
a result. Most were more likely to
make plans to acquire additional
assets because they had IDAs, to
make educational plans for them-
selves and for their children, and to
make plans for their retirement.
They found the economic education
and training helped them to save,
and many found learning about
budgeting and money management
particularly helpful. A number of
June 30, 2000, over 82 percent of
the participants had positive net
deposits; 99 percent had made at
least one deposit. About 16 percent
of enrollees left the program. The
average and median net deposits per
month were $25.42 and $17.96,
respectively. For all participants, the
average and median savings rates
(defined as the ratio of the average
monthly net deposit to gross month-
ly household income) were 2.2 per-
cent and 1.3 percent, respectively.
Perhaps surprisingly, the mean sav-
ings rate and, for the most part, the
median savings rate appear to rise
with lower income levels.
Savings uses, intended and actual:
More than half of the participants
who remained in the program but
had not yet made matched with-
drawals intended to use their sav-
ings for a home, with lesser numbers
aiming for post-secondary education
and microenterprise. By contrast, as
of June 30, 2000, of the participants
who made matched withdrawals,
substantial and roughly equal num-
bers used the monies for home pur-
chase, post-secondary education,
microenterprise, and home repair,
while a lesser number directed them
to retirement and job training. Fewer
participants than intended actually
used their savings to buy a home;
this may have been because the pur-
chase of a home requires a relative-
ly large lump-sum deposit.  
Participant characteristics and pro-
gram outcomes: A variety of demo-
graphic characteristics have been
correlated with success in maintain-
ing program participation. About 16
percent of the enrollees in ADD had
left the program as of June 30,
2000. The exit rate was not linked
to gender and was statistically the
same by race; it had no statistically
be noted that American Dream Dem-
onstration (ADD) participants have
been described as being “more disad-
vantaged” than the overall U.S.
population who are at or below 200
percent of the federal poverty guide-
lines. They are more likely to be
female, African-American, and never
married. They are also “more advan-
taged” in that they are more educat-
ed, more likely to be employed, and
more likely to have a bank account. 
Because of the similarity of the ADD
program to other IDA programs,
these results may have broad
application. Indeed, a recent evalua-
tion of a state-supported program,
Family Assets for Independence in
Minnesota, yielded similar outcomes
for a participant population similar
in many respects to the one in the
ADD demonstration.
Participants: Most of the partici-
pants in the American Dream
Demonstration were female; a sub-
stantial majority were in their 30s or
younger; nearly half were African-
American; nearly half were never-
married; and overall, more than
three-quarters were single by reason
of divorce, separation, or widow-
hood. Most were in households with
children, mostly one or two chil-
dren; nearly four out of 10 had a
high school diploma or less; and
almost the same fraction had attend-
ed college but had received no
degree. Nearly one-half had incomes
below the poverty level and more
than one-fifth had incomes below
50 percent of the poverty level; one-
tenth were current welfare recipients
and nearly four out of 10 were for-
mer recipients; modest numbers
received additional assistance.
Savings outcomes: The data tend to
refute the idea that certain groups
are simply “too poor” to save and
participate in an IDA program. It
appears that individuals of low
income, even those who receive
public assistance, adhere to “middle-
class” values about sacrificing and
saving now for future benefits. From
the program’s inception in June
1997 through the period ending
T
he data tend to refute the idea that certain
groups are simply “too poor” to save. 
P
erhaps surprisingly, the mean savings rate and,
for the most part, the median savings rate
appear to rise with lower income levels.ify at a later time. Correspondingly,
having a stable employment and
work schedule and sufficient earned
income to permit regular savings is
generally important.
Success also depends upon motiva-
tion, the willingness to establish
goals, and the commitment to
achieve them. In this regard, client
contact and individual attention
appear to be important. For exam-
ple, the making of savings deposits
and maintenance of saving are
spurred by the match incentives,
exhortations, and mechanisms that
make saving easy and that lock it in.
In addition, support in the form of
advice, counseling, and advocacy
may be necessary in the event of a
personal, job, or housing-related cri-
sis. Non-crisis supports may also be
important, as is group support.
Further, IDA programs recognize
IDA participants pointed to support
from program staff helping them to
save, as well as to peer support,
either by virtue of camaraderie or by
learning of strategies for saving and
asset maintenance.
Optimism that such outcomes may
emerge is tempered by recognition
that a number of personal factors
appear to have a bearing on success
in IDA programs and, hence, limit its
promise for some low-income indi-
viduals. For example, those who are
seriously stressed, emotionally or
financially, may not be able to sus-
tain the required commitment to the
program. If debt and credit problems
are obstacles to acceptance, appli-
cants may be rejected, but if they
are given the opportunity to work
those problems out and gain related
budgeting and income management
skills in the interim, they may qual-
Perhaps because they are start-
ups, ADD programs have required
substantial resources; the same
appears to be true for other IDA
programs, many of which are at a
roughly comparable stage of
development. A recent estimate
of overall costs for the ADD pro-
gram from its inception through
June 2000 is $70.38 per partici-
pant-month or $2.77 per dollar of
net deposit (and, if the match is
included, a total outlay of roughly
$6 per dollar of net deposit).
These figures reflect start-up
costs, so long-term costs are like-
P
articipants used a variety of strategies to
save. Most significant was their more effi-
cient use of resources — shopping more
carefully and eating out less.
The Costs of Starting an IDA
that even if participants are success-
ful at saving, they need support and
resources that will enable them to
use their newly acquired financial
assets to achieve the goals they have
chosen. Thus, for new IDAs, in addi-
tion to what appear to be substantial
requirements for staff at start-up,
there is continued need for staff to
motivate and support participants,
frequently on a one-to-one basis,
and to monitor their programs. 
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ly to be smaller. Indeed, program
expenses dropped to $43.06 per
participant month and to $2.02
per dollar of net deposit from
June 1999 to June 2000.
Greater efficiencies may be
achieved over time. Some ele-
ments of the program, such as the
financial literacy component,
could be standardized and made
widely available to IDA programs.
Training or other services could
be contracted out to organiza-
tions that specialize in that com-
ponent, and partnerships with
those managing the program
could be formed. Economies of
scale might be achieved if IDA
programs were to expand greatly.
However, if IDAs are expanded to
reach a broader low-income pop-
ulation, different needs for sup-
port and services would likely
emerge. For that reason, as
Michael Sherraden has noted, a
two-tier IDA program might be
appropriate: one with broad
access, simple services, and lower
costs; the other, with targeted
access, intensive services, and
higher costs.
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into Reality 
by Kathleen Gill
The Network11 c & b
O
n a recent Wednesday night at
the Roxbury Boys & Girls Club,
a group of men and women
ranging in age from 25 to over 50 gath-
ered to discuss an issue of common
concern: homeownership. With $120
already in their savings accounts after
just four meetings, each participant
planned to save $1,500 within the year
and ultimately to purchase a home. This
accomplishment will be all the more
meaningful because the average annual
participant income is under $35,000. 
This group is part of a program known
as “The Network,” an Individual
Development Account (IDA) group with
a twist — it prepares participants to pur-
chase a home in just one year, instead
of the two to three years of the more
standard program. The Network is run
by a faith-based collaborative of five
organizations composed of the Black
Ministerial Alliance, Christian Economic
Coalition, Emmanuel Gospel Center,
Greater Boston Interfaith Coalition, and
United Christian Financial Services
Association. Its IDA program is founded
on the principle that the keys to eco-
“Never doubt that a small group of committed
individuals can change the world. Indeed it is the
only thing that ever has.” – Margaret MeadBefore beginning their IDA program,
the three ministers extensively
researched existing programs and
then adjusted their program model
to better fit the communities they
know so well. The resulting program
varies from the traditional IDA pro-
gram in a number of significant
ways. A traditional IDA program, as
developed by the American Dream
Demonstration Project, generally
lasts between two and three years.
Participants are asked to save $25 to
$50 per month, and group meetings
occur between once per week and
once per month. Program funds
match participant savings from $1
to $1 all the way up to $6 to $1. The
average match rate is $2 to $1.
The Network Program in Boston
lasts for one year, meeting 50 times,
and participants are asked to save
aggressively. Each “student” saves
$30 each week, or $120 per month.
At the end of the program, students
receive a $4 to $1 match, bringing
their savings total to $7,500. This
amount can then be used as a down
payment on a house. The matching
dollars are from two sources, the
Federal Home Loan Bank of Boston
and the City of Boston.
The rationale behind the short pro-
gram duration and high savings
rate is threefold. First, the single-
year duration and weekly involve-
ment  encourage student retention.
Second, the high amount of savings
is necessary to purchase a home in
Boston’s expensive housing market.
Third, the high savings rate increas-
es a student’s emotional investment
in the class. “The amount was
enough to have people think about
changing their spending habits,”
says the Rev. Gearin.
Since meetings take place on a
weekly basis and students save on a
weekly basis, it is more likely that
real behavioral change can occur.
Says the Rev. Kelley, “How could
you be accountable for a lifestyle
change if you are only [saving] once
a month? If you are saving every
week, it becomes part of your life.”
The meetings are also structured
differently than the traditional,
nomic advancement are savings and
financial literacy.
The United States has long been
plagued by a low personal savings
rate. A June 2001 paper on person-
al savings states, “There is wide-
spread perception that the rate of
. . . personal savings [in the United
States] is too low.”1 Although
economists argue about whether
the measure has been distorted by
not counting pension contributions
and capital gains, on average the
United States saves very little. On a
personal level, the inability to save
regularly and control one’s finan-
cial life can have dire conse-
quences. In the low- and moderate-
income community, lack of good
financial habits can lead to poverty
and permanent indebtedness. 
The Network in Boston’s Roxbury
and Mattapan neighborhoods is
seeking to assist the low- and mod-
erate-income community in increas-
ing savings rates through economic
education. The goal of the program is
for each participant to save $1,500 in
an individual development account
and to use these savings, plus pro-
gram matching funds, for a down
payment on a home. The program
was developed by the Reverends
Frank Kelley, Brian Gearin, and
Bishop Glen Prospere. 
Last year, The Network asked four
churches to pilot their newly created
IDA program.  While the organizers
had anticipated a group of perhaps
30 participants, the initial orienta-
tion attracted 130 community mem-
bers from both within the four
churches and among friends of
parishioners. As of June 2001, of the
original 88 enrollees, 61 had com-
pleted the program’s savings require-
ments and 50 weeks of training. 
While most of these graduates have
begun searching for a home, the
expensive Boston housing market
has made it difficult to find one in
the appropriate price range. To date
about eight or nine have purchased
a home or are in negotiations to
buy. The program has now begun
its second round of training, with
86 participants.
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Peer teaching allows 
students of The Network to help their classmates and to feel empowered.proud owner of a two-family home
in Rhode Island. While high Boston
housing costs precipitated her move
out of state, she has managed to
achieve her goal of owning a home.
Reina I. Galindo, a 45-year-old sin-
gle mother from the South End, is
another success story, although she
hasn’t bought a home yet. Galindo
has never owned a home nor have
her parents. Says Galindo, “The class
has been a wonderful experience.
Many minority people have never
known how to go to the bank and
ask for a loan, fix their credit, save
money. I always thought it would be
too hard; now it has become a whole
lot easier to understand.” She also
found that having the meetings in a
church setting made it easier to
believe in her dream of homeowner-
ship, and the support that she
received from other participants
energized her to complete the pro-
gram. She says she thinks about
money differently now. Since finish-
ing the program, she has continued
to save and hopes to buy a home
sometime soon.
Endnotes
1. Bernheim, Douglas B. and Daniel
M. Garrett, “The Effects of Financial
Education in the Workplace: Evidence
from a Survey of Households,” Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research,
revised June 2001.
About the Author
Kathleen Gill worked as a Community
Affairs Specialist with the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston for the past three years.
Communities & Banking wishes her well in
her future endeavors. 
volunteers who act as facilitators.
The program operates in church
basements, and the administration
of savings is done by the group
itself. Each week, the elected student
treasurer collects savings from the
students and issues receipts. The
money is then deposited in a local
bank where it earns the savings-
account interest rate and is not sub-
ject to fees. Students are issued their
own ATM cards, with which they
can make deposits and check bal-
ances. The ATM cards are designed
so that the students cannot use them
to withdraw money.
Edith Senfuma, a 29-year-old for-
mer resident of Roxbury, is a case
study of how well the program has
worked. “If it wasn’t for Reverend
Kelley and the other teachers, I don’t
know when I would have bought a
house. I always dreamed of owning
a home, but I didn’t think it was pos-
sible right now,” says Senfuma. She
learned about the program through
the People’s Baptist Church. She
thought it sounded like a good idea
until she attended the first meeting
and heard that she would need to
attend every week for 50 weeks. As
a student and employee, she didn’t
believe she would have time.
However, with encouragement, she
made the commitment and succeed-
ed. Last month she became the
instructor-based model. In a tradi-
tional model, a trained professional
guides students to financial literacy
through a series of lectures and
exercises. The Network follows a
peer-group model with facilitators
treated as invited guests. Students
run their own meetings, creating a
feeling of empowerment.
The program curriculum is divided
into three, roughly equal, phases. In
the first phase, students develop
financial literacy. They meet in
small groups to discuss matters such
as credit reports, credit repair, sav-
ing, budgeting, amortizing a loan,
and other financial matters. The
second part of the program’s cur-
riculum revolves around financial
stewardship. In this phase, the
group discusses developing finan-
cial goals, ethics in business, taxes,
and money management. The final
portion of the curriculum is prima-
rily technical assistance. During this
stage, a series of presentations
introduces students to home inspec-
tors, bankers, conveyancing attor-
neys, realtors, and other profession-
als involved in the home-buying
process. The goal is to eliminate the
fear of approaching professionals.
To keep costs down, the program is
run by the three ministers and a
small group of highly committed
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Students are issued their own ATM cards. . . . designed so that the students






WorkEnglanders did not claim the federal
credit.1 As a result, workers in New
England possibly missed out on $91
million to $104 million.
Says Wancheck, “There is concern
about specific groups of workers
whose eligibility may not be evi-
dent to them.” These groups of
workers include foster parents,
working grandparents with custody
of grandchildren, workers whose
children are over age 18 but are
attending school full-time, and
workers who care for adult relatives
who are permanently disabled.
Further, a study by the Urban
Institute reports that many more
Hispanic workers, as compared to
non-Hispanic workers, do not claim
the credit.2 Language barriers and
fears of deportation may explain
part of this disparity.
Credit Brief
The Earned Income Tax Credit is a
refundable income tax credit that
provides supplementary income to
working families and individuals.
The credit is the government’s pri-
he Earned Income Tax
Credit provides additional
income to working families
and individuals, yet there is
increasing evidence that millions of
dollar in credit benefits go
unclaimed each year. According to
John Wancheck, Earned Income Tax
Credit (EITC) Campaign Coordinator
at the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, a nonpartisan research
and policy institute, “Past research
and the continued experience of
community groups who conduct
EITC outreach and free tax prepara-
tion programs indicate that substan-
tial numbers of eligible workers do
not claim the credit.” 
In tax year 1999, 19 million work-
ing families and individuals across
the United States received over $30
billion in credit refunds. Over
625,000 New Englanders received
close to $1 billion, about $1,460 per
claimant. However, recent reports
indicate that $9 million in earned
income credit was unclaimed by
Boston residents. An estimated 10
to 15 percent of qualified New
mary aid program to the working
poor in the United States. 
Unlike most tax credit programs, the
earned income credit reduces the
amount of income tax a person
owes and can also provide a refund.
For example, if a person owes $200
in income taxes and is eligible for
$2,000 of earned income credit, she
would receive an $1,800 refund.
Working families and individuals
whose incomes are less than
$31,152 can qualify for the credit.3
Families can qualify for the maxi-
mum credit depending on the num-
ber of qualifying children they claim
(see Table 1). Typically, a qualifying
child is any child under the age of
19 or, if a full-time student, under
the age of 24.
Eligible workers can claim the cred-
it by completing Schedule EIC and
attaching it to their tax return. The
Internal Revenue Service makes an
effort to notify workers it believes
are eligible for the credit; however,
workers who are exempt from filing
tax returns (because of low wage
earnings) are not contacted and may
lose out on receiving benefits. 
In addition to the federal program,
16 states offer the credit. The state
credits are anywhere from 5 to 32
percent of the federal credit (see
Table 2).4 For example, if the state
credit is set at 15 percent and a
worker qualifies for $2,000 in feder-
al credit, then that worker would be
eligible for $300 in state credit.




Income Limits and Maximum Credits for EITC 
Worker Status Income Limit Maximum Credit
No Children $10,380 $353
One Child $27,413 $2,353
Two or More Children $31,152 $3,888
Note: Tax year 2000. This is not a tax table. Do not use it to complete income
tax returns.
15 c & bfour states have a program in
place.5 In Massachusetts and
Vermont, a worker could receive the
credit as a refund. But in Rhode
Island or Maine, the worker can only
eliminate any taxes owed up to the
credit amount. 
EITC Outreach
In response to the reports of missed
credit benefits, many local, state,
and federal officials have stepped
up their efforts to promote the
earned income credit. In Boston,
city officials are already planning
free training and outreach efforts in
concert with local Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) officials and commu-
nity groups. 
Paul Leavy, who conducts EITC out-
reach in Massachusetts for the IRS,
asserts that outreach has already
begun for tax year 2001. He points
to two main goals for this year’s
efforts. One is to increase overall
participation in the credit program
through heightened public aware-
ness. The other is to encourage New
Englanders to volunteer to conduct
free tax preparation services, espe-
cially in low- and moderate-income
and immigrant communities.
Says Leavy, “The IRS indicates that
60 percent of those who do claim
the EITC use commercial tax servic-
es to file their returns. Fewer than
one in ten have their tax forms pre-
pared for free by Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance (VITA) programs.”
He notes that commercial tax serv-
ices charge fees that reduce the ben-
efits of credit refunds and conduct















sors VITA programs, but they are not
available in every community.
Community organizations can host a
VITA site and recruit volunteers to
help with tax preparation. 
With the credit amount increasing to
as much as $4,088 in tax year 2001,
the opportunity cost of not claiming
the credit is great for eligible work-
ers and their local communities that
could benefit from the additional
consumer spending. The challenge
will be to create outreach strategies
that transcend language and other
barriers that now prevent some eli-
gible workers from claiming the
credit. To get involved, see the
resources list below. 
Additional Tax Programs for
Working Families
Two other federal tax credit programs
— the Child Tax Credit and the Child
and Dependent Care Credit — are
noteworthy because they can work in
concert with the Earned Income Tax
Credit. Below is a summary of how
the programs can be used.
First, a taxpayer must pay federal
income taxes in order to claim the
Child Tax Credit. This credit is worth
up to $500 per child, and can give a
taxpayer back some or all of the
income tax taken out of her pay-
check, as well as offset any addi-
tional taxes she owes at the end of
the year. Single parents with
incomes up to $75,000 and married
parents with incomes up to $110,000
can claim the Child Tax Credit.
Second, a taxpayer must pay feder-
al income taxes as well as child or
dependent care expenses to claim
the Child and Dependent Care
Credit. This credit is a tax benefit
that is available to families. Eligible
taxpayers can receive reimburse-
ment for 20 to 30 percent of their
dependent and child care expenses,
depending on income. The credit
can be as much as $720 for a tax-
payer with one child and $1,440 for
a taxpayer with more than one child
or dependent. 
Four states in New England also
offer Child and Dependent Care pro-
grams. Maine offers a refundable
credit, and Rhode Island and
Vermont offer non-refundable credit
programs. Massachusetts offers a
deduction for child and dependent
care expenses. Connecticut offers no
program, and New Hampshire does
not collect personal income tax.
Endnotes
1. This is a rough estimate based on
conversations with IRS officials and
an earlier study. See Scholz, John K.,
“The Earned Income Tax Credit:
Participation, Compliance, and Anti-
poverty Effectiveness,” National Tax
Journal, 47:1 pp. 63-87, March 1994.
2. Phillips, Katherin R., “Who Knows
about the Earned Income Tax Credit?”
The Urban Institute, Income and
Benefits Policy Center, January 2001.
3. Information from “Factsheets on
the 2001 EIC,” Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities, March 2001.
4. Johnson, Nicholas, “A HAND UP:
How State Earned Income Tax Credits
Help Working Families Escape
Poverty in 2001,” Center on Budget
and Policy Priorities, October 2001.
5. Connecticut does not have an EITC
program. New Hampshire has no per-
sonal income tax on earned income.
About the Author
George Samuels is a Community Affairs




EITC Benefits for Selected States in New England 
State Percent of Federal Credit
Maine 5 (non-refundable)
Massachusetts 15
Rhode Island 25.5 (non-refundable)
Vermont 32
Note: Tax year 2001. 
Taxpayer Education Coordinator and Volunteer 
Income Tax Assistance (VITA) Program for New England 
Internal Revenue Service
JFK Federal Building, Stop 40726
15 New Sudbury Street
Boston, MA 02203-9112
(617) 316-2501 in Boston, MA 
or (800) TAX-1040 outside of Boston
For additional EITC outreach materials, please visit the Center for Budget
and Policy Priorities at http://www.cbpp.org/eic2001/index.html to down-
load. To order a free copy, e-mail eickit@cbpp.org, call (202) 408-1080, or
fax (202) 408-1056.
16 c & bLenders and 
Third-Party Brokers
Perspectives on Credit Scoring
and Fair Mortgage Lending
Article Three in a Five-Part SeriesCredit scoring is an underwriting tool used
to evaluate the creditworthiness of prospective borrow-
ers. Utilized for several decades to underwrite certain
forms of consumer credit, scoring has come into com-
Article Series Background
mon usage in the mortgage lending industry only in
the last ten years. Scoring brings a high level of effi-
ciency to the underwriting process, but it also has
raised concerns about fair lending among historically
underserved populations.
The purpose of the Federal Reserve System’s Credit
Scoring Committee is to collect and publish perspec-
tives on credit scoring in the mortgage underwriting
process, specifically with respect to potential dispari-
ties between majority and minority homebuyers in the
home search or credit application process. The intro-
ductory article of the series (Spring 2000 issue of
Communities & Banking) provided the context for the
issues. The second article (Winter 2001) dealt with
lending policy development, credit-scoring model
selection, and model maintenance. 
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While lending institutions may actively review and assess their own cred-
it-scoring models for potential unlawful disparities, it is also important
for lenders to monitor their relationships with third-party brokers.
Mortgage brokers make credit available in communities that do not have
traditional lending institutions. Lenders establish relationships with
third-party brokers to reach these markets.
Lenders need to consider how their third-party brokers comply with fair
lending laws and use credit-scoring models. Lenders who knowingly work
with non-compliant brokers and take no action may be liable as co-cred-
itors. The following situations may lead to increased regulatory risk expo-
sure for the lending institution: The lender may build in a high broker
overage tied to the credit score; the broker may obtain a credit report or
credit score and use it to underwrite and price a proposed deal prior to
submitting it to a lender; or a broker may screen applicants or steer them
to higher-priced products even if the applicant’s overall risk profile (cred-
it score) does not necessarily warrant it.
Considering the credit-scoring issues outlined above, what strategies
can lenders adopt to better manage their third-party broker relation-
ships? What can third-party brokers do to ensure compliance with fair
lending regulations? 
he rise of predatory lending practices has put increasing pres-
sure on lenders to oversee the practices of their third-party
mortgage brokers. Third-party mortgage brokers solicit cus-
tomers and generate loans on behalf of lenders. How lenders over-
see the practices of their third-party mortgage brokers, especially
for compliance with fair lending laws, pricing policies, and the use
of credit scoring, is the focus of this article. Contributors to this
installment in the article series — including a lawyer, regulator,
consumer advocate, and retired Department of Justice counselor —





Financial institutions can have a great
deal of control over the practices of
their third-party mortgage brokers,
especially for compliance with fair-
lending laws, pricing policies, and the
use of credit-scoring models.
There is a close relationship among
traditional financial institutions,
mortgage brokers, and real estate
agents. Brokers know where to get
their clients financed and lenders
have a history of doing business
with certain mortgage brokers and
real estate agents. It is a symbiotic
relationship. Lenders know who is
breaking the law and who is skirting
the law. They know who are the “bad
guys.” In fact, those were the words
used by a mortgage broker who
recently confided, “We know in our
industry, and certainly the financial
institutions know, which mortgage
brokers are really doing a disservice
to clients.” 
The reason mortgage lenders know
the “good guys” from the “bad guys”
is that they have dealt with them
over a number of years. In a situa-
tion where there have been excessive
defaults on loans from the same
mortgage broker, or if defaults often
occur within several months after
the loans, it is not difficult for a
financial institution to gather evi-
dence of what happened and of
potential wrongdoing. There may
have been problems with these
loans: The applications or income
levels may have been falsified, the
credit report may have inconsisten-
cies, or the credit score may not be
sufficient to justify the loan.
At the opposite end of the spectrum,
it would be relatively easy for finan-
cial institutions to identify mortgage
brokers who try to maximize their
commissions by charging some bor-
rowers more than what is “usual”
and “fair” in points, rates, and fees.
These are situations where borrowers
should be able to qualify for tradi-
tional “A” loans but are being
offered subprime “C” loans.  
One strategy for financial institu-
tions to avoid third-party liability
is to test loan application files. In
this fair lending review, the Truth
in Lending Act and the U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban
Contributor
Backgrounds
Edward Kramer is a civil rights attorney and
director and co-founder of The Housing Advocates, Inc.,
a fair housing agency and public interest law firm found-
ed in 1975. The organization receives monies from the
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, pri-
vate foundations, and various local governments. One of
the programs operated by The Housing Advocates is the
Predatory Lending Project. The Project provides legal
assistance to low- and moderate-income residents to pre-
vent predatory lending activities and other consumer
fraud problems, especially in distressed areas of
Cleveland. When violations of the law are identified, they
are referred to private attorneys or to the Fair Housing
Law Clinic. The Clinic is a joint venture between The
Housing Advocates, Inc. and Cleveland State University’s
Cleveland–Marshall College of Law. 
Christopher A. Lombardo is the
Assistant Director for Compliance in the Office of Thrift
Supervision’s Central Region. Based in Chicago, he man-
ages compliance examination, community affairs, and
consumer affairs programs affecting savings institutions
in a seven-state area that stretches from Tennessee to
Wisconsin. Lombardo has 18 years of regulatory experi-
ence with the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and its
predecessors; regional office policy and enforcement
work with OTS and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation; and compliance policy work in Washington,
DC. He has led interagency policy initiatives and has been
active in examiner and industry education. The Office of
Thrift Supervision, an office within the U.S. Department
of the Treasury, is the primary federal supervisory agency
for savings associations. 
Kathleen Muller is the executive director of
the HOPE Homeownership Center in Evansville, Indiana.
Muller has been with HOPE for about 12 years. HOPE pro-
vides housing counseling services to residents throughout
the entire Evansville area. For 35 years, HOPE has been
helping families assess their need for housing and their
ability to buy through credit and budget analysis, and it
certifies their eligibility for special innovative loan pack-
ages. During the past year, HOPE served 450 individuals
and families.
Alexander C. Ross recently retired from the
Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice, where
he worked for over 35 years on lawsuits brought by the
United States to enforce civil rights statutes forbidding
discrimination in voting, employment, education, public
accommodations, housing, and lending. His position for
many years prior to retirement was Special Litigation
Counsel for the Division’s Housing and Civil Enforcement
Section, where he investigated and prosecuted matters
involving a pattern or practice of discrimination in home
mortgage and consumer lending. Ross was the Division’s
lead lawyer in several landmark fair lending cases. 
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Development Good Faith Estimate
— documents regarding the costs of
the loan — should be examined.
Financial institutions should look
at appraisal costs and other fees to
determine if they may be excessive
or unusual. They should look for
credit life insurance packages built
into the loan and see whether the
consumer is being required to pay
for this insurance up-front or for
the life of the loan. If financial
institutions begin to see inconsis-
tencies from broker to broker, that
should send up a red flag. Such a
pattern should result in a closer
scrutiny of all new loans being
submitted by this particular mort-
gage broker. 
Unfortunately, predatory lending
practices are often being funded by
financial institutions. This situation
may be driven by the need to com-
ply with Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) obligations. The Act was
meant to ensure that financial insti-
tutions meet the credit needs of all
communities in their assessment
areas, including low- and-moderate
income neighborhoods. However, in
a perverse way, CRA has in some
cases had the opposite effect. Banks,
rather than using their own branch
system of loan offices, instead
closed down branches, limiting
access and services to these cus-
tomers. These banks have relied
upon third parties, mortgage bro-
kers, and real estate agents to gener-
ate CRA loans.
Lending in this way to low-
and moderate-income bor-
rowers can be profitable
for financial institutions,
but it can cause severe
hardships for the con-
sumer who is often a
minority and/or female head-of-
household. A third-party arrange-
ment allows unscrupulous mortgage
brokers or real estate agents to mis-
use or abuse the system. Banks are
really assessing, “Will this help me
meet my CRA needs and will it meet
our profit motive?” So when some
argue that the third-party system is
more efficient, what they really
mean is that it is more profitable.
However, this is not necessarily what
financial institutions should do if
they are going to be good neighbors
and good businesses for our commu-
nity. They need to make a commit-
ment to the community, which was
the original purpose of the
Community Reinvestment Act — to
require banks to commit themselves
to the community, to those neigh-
borhoods in their credit service areas
that they have not served in the past.
What are the risks if financial insti-
tutions don’t respond to today’s
predatory lending issues? They face
new and costly legislative and regu-
latory initiatives. More important,
they face substantial risk of litiga-
tion. Unlike the Truth in Lending Act
or other consumer laws, federal and
state fair housing laws place special
obligations on the entire housing
industry, including financial institu-
tions. One of these obligations is
that the duty of fair housing and fair
lending is non-delegable. Almost a
quarter century ago, in one of the
first cases involving a racially dis-
criminatory refusal to make a home
loan, our federal court found in
favor of the victim of discrimina-
tion. In Harrison v. Otto G.
Heinzeroth Mortgage Co., 430 F.
Supp. 893, 896-97 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
the court held as follows: 
Thus the Court has no difficulty in
finding the defendant Haugh liable
to the plaintiff.  Under the law, such
a finding impels the same judgment
against the defendant Company and
the defendant Heinzeroth, its presi-
dent, for it is clear that their duty
not to discriminate is a non-dele-
gable one, and that in this area a
corporation and its officers are
responsible for the acts of a subordi-
nate employee, even though these
acts were neither directed nor
authorized. This ruling troubles the
Court to some extent, for it seems
harsh to punish innocent and well-
intentioned employers for the disobe-
dient wrongful acts of their employ-
ees. However, great evils require
strong remedies, and the old rules of
the law require that when one of two
innocent people must suffer, the one
whose acts permitted the
wrong to occur is the one to
bear the burden of it.
[Citations omitted.] 
This decision is not unique in
the law. The courts have
rejected arguments from real
estate brokers that they should not
be held liable for the discriminatory
acts of their independent agents.
Marr v. Rife, 503 F.2d 735 (6th Cir.
1974) and Green v. Century 21,
740 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1984)
found that “under federal housing
law a principal cannot free himself
of liability by delegating a duty
not to discriminate to an agent.”
Furthermore, using the analogy to
the Fair Housing Act, the courts
have found that finance companies
have a  non-delegable duty not to
discriminate under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, which cannot be
avoided by delegating aspects of the
financing transaction to third par-
ties. See Emigrant Sav. Bank v. Elan
Management Corp., 668 F.2d 671,
673 (2d Cir. 1982); United States v.
Beneficial Corp., 492 F. Supp. 682,
686 (D.N.J. 1980), aff’d, 673 F.2d
1302 (3d Cir. 1981); Shuman v.
Standard Oil Co., 453 F. Supp. 1150,
1153-54 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
Now apply this case law to financial
institutions that refuse to monitor
their relationship to mortgage and
real estate brokers. These lenders can
be subjected to substantial damage
awards. Playing ostrich will not
insulate them from any illegal
actions of mortgage brokers and real
estate agents with whom they deal.
If a pattern and practice can be
shown, then financial institutions
are assumed to have control. They
have the ability to say “yes” or “no.”
They have a right to monitor and
determine whether or not these
“independent actors” are breaking
the law. If they knew or should have
known, they can be held liable.
Financial institutions and mortgage
brokers should also follow another
“Certainly the financial institu-
tions know which mortgage brokers
are really doing a disservice to clients.” 
when some argue that the third-party
system is more efficient, what they really mean
is that it is more profitable.21 c & b
example of the real estate industry.
The larger real estate firms have
their own “in-house” Fair Housing
Program to train their staff. Large
companies have their own programs
because they want to make sure that
their real estate agents are aware of
the law and of company policies.
They want these policies imple-
mented.  All employees and inde-
pendent contractors must know the
law, the company’s policies, and that
everyone will uphold fair housing





Before addressing a financial insti-
tution’s relationships with mortgage
brokers, we ought to identify three
facts that represent changes in the
mortgage business landscape over
the past decade.
First, financial institutions increas-
ingly rely on fee income. Interest
rate spreads are, and are like-
ly to remain, razor thin.
Second, automation (includ-
ing credit scoring), securitiza-
tion, and specialization have
revolutionized who does what
and how they do it. Third,
financial institutions rely on
independent mortgage brokers
to maintain a steady supply of loan
originations. Employees in financial
institution branches typically no
longer generate the business. Call
this progress-in-action in a free
enterprise system, or call this a
recipe for disaster. In reality, the sys-
tem is far from free: It is heavily
regulated. With the scourge of
predatory lending, personal and
individual disasters have become
more common, or at least more
widely recognized. Systemic disas-
ters remain rare.
We also ought to clarify our termi-
nology. As is most common, I will
consider the financial institution
(insured depository institution) to
be the funding, originating lender,
and the independent broker to be
the point of contact with the appli-
cant/borrower and the processor of
the loan. The lender/broker rela-
tionship is covered by a mutual
agreement that the other party is
suitable and reliable. The lender
provides the broker with its under-
writing guidelines, highlighting
any deviations from market stan-
dards. The lender provides the bro-
ker with rates, fees, and term infor-
mation — weekly, daily, or as need-
ed. Operating under a lender/broker
arrangement, the broker registers a
rate lock-in and processes the
paperwork. The loan passes down
one of two main paths: the lender
table-funds the loan and reviews it
afterward, or the lender reviews
and approves each loan package
prior to closing.  
Numerous custom and hybrid lend-
ing arrangements exist. However,
one ought to consider what a finan-
cial institution examiner sees: per-
forming loans; the occasional
rejected deal, if the lender docu-
mented it; and the occasional
defaulted loan. The examiner does
not know what transpired between
the broker and the borrower. The
examiner does not know who
ordered, paid for, or prepared the
application. Lenders should know
this information and ought to be
highly selective about the brokers
who bring them business. Lenders
ought to be expert in spotting a
loan that yells, “Run, don’t walk,
from this deal!” The standard to
which a lender should be held
responsible for a broker’s act, error,
or omission is a “knew or should-
have-known” standard.
The compliance examiner assesses
how well a financial institution
manages its compliance risks and
responsibilities. Regarding relation-
ships with mortgage brokers, this
most notably includes compliance
with laws such as the Fair Housing
Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Fair
Credit Reporting Act, Real Estate
Settlement Procedures Act, and
Truth in Lending Act. These laws are
relatively new; in addition, there are
rules governing the privacy of
consumer financial information,
consumer protection rules for
insurance sales, and the Flood
Disaster Protection Act. This
demonstrates that we’re not
describing free enterprise as
envisioned in the eighteenth
century by Adam Smith.  
Beyond the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s
advertising rules implementing the
Fair Housing Act and the Federal
Reserve Board’s advertising rules
implementing the Equal Credit
Opportunity and Truth in Lending
Acts, thrift institutions are prohibit-
ed from any inaccuracy or misrepre-
sentation regarding contracts or
services, including any and all
aspects of their mortgage lending.
The examiner gets a glimpse of
lender activities and an even briefer
look at what the broker has done.
Well-managed financial institutions
make it a point to take a good look
at what the broker has done, but it is
very difficult for the lender to police
the broker’s activities. With the
growing awareness of predatory
lending, most lenders now have sys-
tems in place to detect transactions
that involve fee packing, equity
stripping, and flipping. Lenders have
shifted from presuming that the refi-
nancing deal presented for funding
is what the borrower originally
needed or wanted, and many are
applying some sort of benefit-to-
the-borrower standard.
As a general observation, mortgage
market automation (including credit
scoring), standardization, and spe-
cialization have not posed great
hazards for most financial institu-
tions. Financial institutions have
internally motivated systems for
identifying and correcting problems
outside the supervisory and enforce-
What are the risks if financial institu-
tions don’t respond to today’s predatory
lending issues? . . . they face substantial
risk of litigation.
Lenders ought to be expert in
spotting a loan that yells, “Run, don’t walk,
from this deal!”ment process. The fee-driven nature
of the business and reliance on bro-
ker business do pose hazards, how-
ever. Every financial institution has
stories of mortgage bro-
kers who proposed com-
pensation arrangements
that would violate the Real
Estate Settlement Procedures
Act. Most lenders have sto-
ries of broker efforts to
push unsophisticated indi-
viduals (with or without
marginal credit scores) into higher-
priced deals that offer greater com-
pensation to the broker. The issue of
unearned fees and kickbacks is fair-
ly easy to spot. The issue of pushing
individuals into higher-priced deals,
however, defies detection, often
until much damage has been done.
The uniform interagency examina-
tion procedures adopted by the
federal banking supervisory agen-
cies for fair lending focus on
activity at the margin. In general
terms, it is in transactions with
marginal applicants that under-
writing discrimination may be
identified. The same holds for pric-
ing and the use of credit scoring. A
financial institution, therefore,
needs to have a vigorous review
system in place for broker actions.
This review system should rein-
force the lender’s message about
the kinds of deals it is seeking and
the kind of treatment that will be
extended to prospective customers.  
Aside from individual credit trans-
actions, lenders who stray far from
the mainstream market are most
exposed to allegations of credit dis-
crimination. Regulators are more
sensitive to issues involving inno-
vation, automation, cost control,
and income stability. It is in this
testing of new ideas that we try to
draw a line between acceptable and
unacceptable risk-taking. Financial
institutions whose stated or unstat-
ed goal is to skate on the edge of the
law should expect and be prepared
to deal with problems — some of
them potentially huge.
Lenders need to seek assurance that
scoring representations accurately
reflect their applicants’ scores, par-
ticularly when the score drives the
approve/deny decision, but also
when it results in a loan pricing or
product steering decision and, ulti-
mately, when it impacts broker or
lender compensation, even indirect-
ly. Aside from scrutinizing docu-
ments, lenders should require bro-
kers to provide copies of all credit
reports and scoring information
generated for a mortgage applica-
tion. Lenders should also require
copies of all loan applications gen-
erated. The final application that the
borrower sees, but may not read, at
closing may bear little resemblance
to the representations of the broker
and borrower from start to end of
the transaction.
The lender may be restricted under
his/her correspondent agreement
from making direct contact with a
mortgage applicant. However, the
broker should be willing to encour-
age lender contact to learn the
applicant’s understanding of the
lending process, rather than lose all
of that lender’s business and see the
borrower damaged along the way.
A short post-closing lender survey
completed by the borrower can be a
useful evaluation tool for lenders.
The purpose is to identify deals
closed under some duress or involv-
ing fees and terms that the borrower
did not understand or agree to, and
to isolate these to particular brokers.
These issues are best dealt with
before the borrower is in default or
sitting in the office of his or her con-
gressional representative.
The vast majority of financial insti-
tutions manage their mortgage bro-
ker relationships in an acceptable
manner, as we have found from
years of regular compliance exami-
nations. Our more recent and
detailed inquiry into the ability of
“Most consumers who contact a mort-
gage broker expect the broker to arrange a
loan with the best terms and at the lowest
possible rate.”
Well-managed  financial institu-
tions make it a point to take a good look
at what the broker has done, but it is
very difficult for the lender to police
the broker’s activities.financial institutions to steer clear of
predatory lending practices while
working through independent bro-
kers and seeking fee income has
both reinforced the observation that
the industry is doing a good job and
highlighted some new concerns.
That credit scoring and improved
access to individual credit informa-
tion has added speed and reduced
cost is generally accepted. What has
been done with that new informa-
tion remains an open question for






The use of credit scoring alone does
not ensure that low-cost credit
remains available to persons who
could qualify for it. Lenders should
always have multiple criteria to bal-
ance or offset shortfalls in a per-
son’s credit score, which could be
reduced by a hesitancy to use credit
at all. For example, if a customer
scores 10 to 25 points less than the
minimum score determined to be
necessary for loan qualification, but
they have three or more years on
the job, that strength of character
could offset the low score. In addi-
tion, third-party mortgage brokers
who do not try to look at credit
scoring in a flexible way — such as
looking at work history — and rely
on poor scores without honest sub-
jective analysis, may benefit from
higher-cost loans.
During a recent training session in
Evansville on “Predatory Lending: A
Professional Alert” for brokers,
appraisers, inspectors, title agents —
all those who deal with the consumer
along the path to getting a mort-
gage — Nick Tilima of Education
Resources suggested, “Most con-
sumers who contact a mortgage
broker expect the broker to arrange
a loan with the best terms and at the
lowest possible rate. Most mortgage
brokers do just that, and charge a
reasonable fee for their services.
However, in the subprime market,
there are mortgage brokers who do
just the opposite. That is, the broker
will attempt to sell the borrower on
a loan with the most fees and high-
est rate possible so that the broker
will get more compensation. Some
of these brokers may charge fees of
8 to 10 points. In addition, the bro-
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applicants, both broker and lender
are headed for trouble.
When credit scores affect pricing,
the broker must depend on full and
accurate use of the lender’s pricing
criteria in order to avoid surprises
and legal problems. For example, if
the broker thinks it is presenting a
“B” quality loan and has priced it
with the borrower accordingly, the
deal may not work if the lender
prices it at “B-.” On the other hand,
if a broker knows the borrower has
“A” credit but places the loan with a
subprime lender at an unnecessarily
high price in order to increase the
broker’s profit (when that lender
would accept higher broker fees), the
broker risks involving itself and the
lender in deceptive practices, Real
Estate Settlement Procedures Act
violations, and, if members of pro-
tected groups are adversely affected,
possible violations of the fair lend-
ing laws.
This concludes the third installment
in our series. The Federal Reserve
System’s Credit Scoring Committee
thanks the respondents for their par-
ticipation. The fourth installment will
deal with the level and consistency of
assistance provided to prospective
borrowers in the loan application
process, and the degree to which
applicants are informed about credit
scoring in the mortgage application
and underwriting process.
ker may get additional compensa-
tion from arranging a higher-than-
necessary interest rate for the con-
sumer. For example, the consumer
may qualify for an eight percent
interest rate, but if the broker can
sell the consumer a nine percent
rate, he can keep the differential.”
To address this issue, standardized
fee schedules would go a long way
toward ensuring fair lending to
individuals with lower credit scores.
Brokers and lenders also should be
aware that high credit scores do not
necessarily mean a loan is guaran-
teed. What may have generated the
score to begin with — the ability to
handle many credit lines on a time-
ly basis — enhances most credit
scores. However, the lender is ignor-
ing the fact that multiple obligations
also burden the person’s ability to
repay a new debt.  
Since lenders and brokers may take
advantage of a consumer’s lack of
knowledge or poor credit rating to
charge high interest rates and hid-
den fees, disclosure and pre-loan
education are a must. At a mini-
mum, everyone should be required
to have some sort of education
before buying or refinancing a
house. Consumers would be well
advised to address the credit prob-
lems that keep them from being
considered for a prime loan; but if
they cannot correct these problems,
they should be aware of the avail-
ability of subprime loans that are





To ensure compliance with fair lend-
ing laws, it is essential that the bro-
ker be fully informed of the lender’s
underwriting criteria. Further, when-
ever credit scores are affected by
information gathered by the broker,
the broker must do as good a job as
the lender in documenting the bor-
rower’s qualifications.
When credit scores are used to
accept or deny a loan application,
the broker’s obligation is the same
as it would be with manual under-
writing. If the broker (a) fails to
obtain documentation or (b)
screens out applicants without
adherence to the same processes
the lender uses with its direct